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ABSTRACT 
Nonmarket  goods  include  quality aspects  of market  goods  and  public 
goods  which  may  be  substitutes  or  complements  for  private  goods. 
Traditional methods  of measuring benefits  of  exogenous  changes  in nonmarket 
goods  are based  on Marshallian  demand:  change  in spending  on  market  goods  or 
change  in consumer  surplus.  More  recently,  willingness  to  pay  and  accept 
have  been  used  as  welfare  measures .  This  paper  defines  the  relationships 
among  alternative  measures  of welfare  for  perfect substitutes,  imperfect 
substitutes,  and  complements.  Examples  are  given  to  demonstrate  how  to 
obtain exact measures  from  systems  of market  good  demand  equations . 
Thanks  to  Professor  Deb  Brown,  Purdue  University,  for her  encouragement  and 
help  over  the  period in which  this  paper  was  written. 
Thanks  also  to  the  very helpful  anonymous  reviewers  for  Social  Choice  and 
Welfare. -1-
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Introduction 
This  paper  concerns  the  measurement  of benefits  for  nonmarket  goods. 
Nonmarket  goods  are not priced directly in a  market .  They  include public 
goods  and quality aspects  of market  goods.  The  need  for benefit measurement 
arises  from  the  need  to  evaluate  government  programs  or policies when 
nonmarket  goods  are provided or are  regulated by  a  government . 
Nonmarket  goods  may  be  perfect substitutes  for  market  goods:  for 
example,  irrigation water  can be  either publically or privately  provided. 
Market  and nonmarket  goods  may  also be  complements:  for  example  water 
quality may  enhance  fishing which  may  be  privately provided.  The  case  of 
imperfect  substitutes has  been  given less attention but  is  also very 
relevant for  policy purposes:  for  example ,  public health programs  may 
substitute for private health care ;  also,  improvements  in air quality may 
substitute for health care  and air filters. 
Traditional methods  of valuing nonmarket  goods  may  be  classified  as 
being of  two  main  types  - based on either  a  consumer  surplus  measure  or  on 
change  in spending  for  related private  goods  (Prest  and  Turvey;  Mishan) . 
The  justification for  use  of  consumer  surplus  is  that it measures  the  excess 
of willingness  to  pay  over  actual  payment  for  a  market  commodity  (Currie, 
Murphy,  and  Schmitz) .  Consumer  surplus  measures  are  obtained as  areas  under 
Marshallian demand  curves  for  which  consumer  income  is held constant. 
Two  different consumer  surplus  areas  have  been applied for  nonmarket 
goods .  The  area under  the  inverse  demand  curve,  integrated over  the 
quantity  change,  has  been used when  public  and private  goods  are perfect 
substitutes  (eg.,  irrigation water)  (p .  34,  Principles  and  Standards  for 
Planning,  Water  Resources  Council).  The  area between  two  demand  curves  has -2-
been used  to measure benefits when  a  nonmarket  good  is  complementary  to  a 
private  good  and  the  demand  curve  for  the  related private  good shifts with 
change  in  the  nonmarket  good.  This  method has  been used  to  evaluate 
recreation benefits when  demand  for visits  to  a  location shifts with 
environmental  quality  (Freeman). 
The  change  in spending for  transportation with  and without  a 
transportation project has  been used  to  measure  the benefits  of an 
investment  in transportation  (Prest  and  Turvey) .  For health benefits 
related to  air quality,  spending  on health care which  is  avoided by 
improvements  in air quality has  been used  to  measure benefits  (Ridker). 
Change  in property values  (spending  on housing)  is  a  method  used  to  estimate 
air quality benefits  (Freeman).  Change  in spending  is also based  on 
Marshallian  demand,  but it is  more  simply  computed  than  consumer  surplus 
since it is price  times  quantity for  goods  related to  a  nonmarket  good. 
Another  method  of obtaining benefit measures  used particularly in 
environmental  economics  literature is  "willingness  to  pay"  and  "willingness 
to  accept"  (Freeman)  measured  through  surveys.  Willingness  to  pay  and 
accept measures  are  related to  equivalent  and  compensating variation which 
are based on  Hicksian rather  than Marshallian  demand  (Maler:  Currie,  Murphy, 
and  Schmitz).  Compensating  and  equivalent variation have  measures  that also 
have  been called "exact"  measures  because  they  can be  expressed in terms  of 
change  in utility from  a  given reference  point  (Hause,  McKenzie).  Although 
no  measure  can be  truly  "exact"  (Ng,  p.  99),  exact measures  exhibit 
preferred mathematical properties  such  as  "integrability"  and 
"acceptability"  reviewed below. 
Consumer  surplus has  been  shown  to  approximate  exact measures  under 
certain conditions  for  the  case  of price  changes  in market  goods  (Willig). 
Willig developed  some  rules  of  thumb  for  determining when  the  size of  the 
error  (the  difference between  exact  and  surplus  measures)  is  small  based  on 
the  income  elasticity of demand.  More  recently  the  comparison  of exact -3-
measures  and  consumer  surplus has  been made  for  quotas  on market  goods 
(Randall  and Stoll)  and  for household production with public  goods 
(Bockstael  and McConnell).  Consumer  surplus  may  not be  very close  to  exact 
measures  in some  cases  (Lankford). 
This  paper  considers  the  relationship  among  alternative  types  of 
welfare  measures  (change  in consumer  surplus  areas,  change  in spending, 
willingness  to  pay,  willingness  to  accept)  for  a  general  relationship 
(demand  interdependence)  between market  and  nonmarket  goods.  Although  the 
literature has  primarily focussed  on  complementarity between market  and 
nonmarket  goods,  "demand  interdependence"  means  more  generally that  a 
nonmarket  good will observably affect  the  demand  for  related market  goods, 
either as  complements  or  as  substitutes  (perfect or  imperfect). 
A  unified framework  is given here  for  defining exact measures  and  for 
comparing alternative types  of welfare  measures  for  nonmarket  goods.  Size 
relationships  are  compared for willingness  to  pay,  willingness  to  accept , 
consumer  surplus,  and  change  in spending,  for both substitutes  and 
complements.  Knowing  such  size relationships  is useful  for  policy analysis 
purposes  - e.g.  if one  type  of measure  is  more  convenient  to  estimate  than 
another. 
Some  well-known  demand  systems  are  used  to  demonstrate  how  exact 
welfare  measures  for nonmarket  goods  can be  obtained  from  related market 
demand  information.  Similar  to  the  method  used by  Hausman  and Varian for 
price  changes  in market  goods,  the  method  of obtaining exact measures 
requires  solving  a  system of differential  equations based  on  market  demand 
to  derive  the  expenditure  function  and  then using  the  expenditure  function 
directly to  define welfare  measures. -4-
Issues  in Welfare  Measurement 
Past work  in welfare measures  concerned evaluation of price  changes, 
while  more  recent literature has  included evaluation of public  goods  and 
quality aspects  of market  goods.  Below  we  briefly review recent welfare 
measurement  issues  regarding price  changes  in market  goods  which  are  applied 
to  nonrnarket  goods  in succeeding sections.  Two  mathematical criteria for 
welfare  measures  are  "acceptability"  and  "integrability".  "Observab-ility" 
has  been another major  concern for  welfare  measures. 
Acceptability has  to  do  with whether  a  ranking of situations obtained 
from  applying  a  measure  would be  consistent with  a  utility function 
representing  a  preference  ordering  (Hause,  Chipman  and  Moore,  McKenzie  and 
Pearce).  For  a  price  change  in a  market  good,  the  equivalent variation is 
considered  to  be  an acceptable  measure  whereas  compensating variation and 
consumer  surplus  measures  are  not.  Because  it is  a  monetary  measure  which 
orders  choices  the  same  as  a  utility function would,  McKenzie  and  Pearce 
apply  the  term  "money  metric"  to  the  equivalent variation measure.  However, 
McKenzie  and  Pearce still support  the  application of compensating variation 
for  compensation purposes  rather  than  for  making welfare  comparisons. 
"Integrability"  (or path  independence)  is required  so  that market 
demand  relations  are well-defined in the  case  of multiple price  changes 
(Silberberg,  Takayama).  As  discussed by  Takayama,  observed  demands  cannot 
correspond  to  a  utility maximization  solution if integrability conditions  do 
not hold.  Exact measures  automatically satisfy integrability because  they 
are  derived  from  the  expenditure  function whereas  Marshallian  demand  may  not 
satisfy these  conditions. 
Hausman  showed  that  approximation of exact  measures  by  consumer  surplus 
or other  means  is not necessary because  exact measures  may  be  obtained by 
solving  for  the  expenditure  function  from  observed  demand  relations.  In the 
case  of  demand  systems  the  method  was  incompletely  applied by  Hausman  to 
obtain "quasi-expenditure"  functions.  Varian  demonstrated how  to  obtain  the -5-
expenditure  function with multiple  goods  by  solving  a  system  of differential 
equations based on market  demand.  Vartia and  McKenzie  developed related 
numerical  methods  for  obtaining exact measures  for  demand  systems  without 
explicitly solving the  system of  demand  equations.  Earlier,  Hurwicz  and 
Uzawa  gave  the  same  representation of this  solution as  Vartia.  Bergland  and 
Randall  have  recently developed computation  techniques  based  on  control 
theory  to  implement  the Vartia method. 
Evaluation of nonmarket  good  changes  is  considered  to present  a  greater 
problem  than price  changes  for  welfare  measurement  because  of observability. 
Bradford and Hildebrandt  proposed  "demand  interdependence"  as  a  general 
condition necessary  to  obtain welfare measures  from  observable  demands  for 
private  goods.  However,  only special cases  have  been studied in the 
literature.  The  case  when  there  is  a  quota  on  a  good  otherwise  available  in 
a  market  was  studied by  Randall  and Stoll.  The  quota  case  is  a  special  case 
of perfect substitutes .  Consumer benefits  are  obtained when  restrictions 
are  eased  so  that more  of  this  good  can be  provided.  In this  case ,  the 
observable  inverse  demand  relation can be  used  to  measure  the  benefit of  a 
change  in the  quota.  Randall  and Stoll's analysis  comparing  surplus  and 
exact measures  for  this  special case paralleled Willig's  analysis  for  price 
changes,  and  they similarly demonstrated  that  the  area  under  an  inverse 
Marshallian  demand  curve ,  integrated over  quantity,  may  be  close  in value  to 
exact measures.  Lankford  disagreed that  such  error is  small  because  of 
income  effects,  using  a  numerical  example  to  demonstrate  the  potential size 
of  the "error.  He  showed  that  two  income  effects must  be  considered  - - the 
direct effect  due  to  change  in consumption  of  the  good with  the  quota  and 
the  indirect effect due  to  subsequent utility adjustments; 
Maler  introduced the  concept  of  "weak  complementarity"  -- when  a 
nonmarket  good produces  no  benefit in the  absence  of  the  market  good  -- and 
showed  that this  relationship  can be  used  to  derive  exact measures  for  a -6-
nonmarket  good  from  observable  market  demand.  Bradford  and Hildebrandt  also 
studied only  the  weak  complementarity case. 
Willig  studied another market  relationship  case  -- when market  goods 
have  a  quality aspect which  affects  demand.  Consumer  surplus  was  shown  to 
be  a  valid measure  of quality benefit for  the  special  case  when  the  demand 
function  is of the  "repackaging"  form  which  gives  rise  to  an  expenditure 
function which  is weakly  separable  in price .and quality.  To  ensure  that 
Marshallian surplus  is finite,  the  qualitative  good  is  also  required to  be 
"non-essential"  -- with  zero  consumption being admissable. 
Generally  speaking,  demand  interdependence  includes  the  quota  case, 
Willig's  repackaging  case,  and Maler's  weak  complementarity  case.  It also 
includes  cases  considered here  in which  a  public  good  may  substitute 
imperfectly or perfectly for  a  private  good. 
Definition of the  Expenditure  Function with  Demand  Interdependence 
The  consumer  purchases  private  goods  Xi  at  a  price Pi  and Marshallian 
demand  for  some  goods  are  observably affected by nonmarket  goods.  A  market 
good  (x.)  exhibits  "demand  interdependence"  with  a  nonmarket  good  Y  if 
1 
aXi 
ay  is not  zero.  The  problem  is  to  measure  the benefit  to  consumers  of an 
exogenous  nonmarket  good  change  based  on market  observations.  In contrast 
to  consumer  surplus,  so-called exact measures  of welfare  defined here  do  not 
require distinctions  to  be  made  as  to  whether  goods  are  complements  or 
substitutes.  The  analysis  below  assumes  that market  good prices  are 
constant.  Appendix  2  extends  the  definition of exact welfare  measures  to 
include both nonmarket  good  changes  and  exogenous  price  changes. 
The  preference  model  for  market  good  choice  as  related to  a  nonmarket 
good  Y  is  given as  follows  where  U(M,Y,p)  denotes  the  indirect utility 
function : U(M,Y,p)  - Max  U(x,Y) 
x 
s .t.  P  •  x  ~ M; 
-7-
(1) 
x  denotes  private  good  consumption  (a vector with  components  xi)'  p  is  a 
vector of market  good price,  Y  denotes  an  exogenous  quantity of  a  nonmarket 
good,  and M is  income  of  the  consumer.  We  assume  Y  is  a  nonsatiated  "good", 
i . e .,  Uy  >  0  and  goods  related to Yare noninferior. 
As  discussed by  Hanemann,  this model  is more  general  than Lancaster's 
model  of characteristics  in which  x  and Yare linearly related.  The 
preference model  is also  similar mathematically  to  the household production 
model  in which utility is  a  function  of household output  Z  - Z(x,Y)  where 
Y  denotes  nonpurchased  inputs  and  x  denotes  purchased  inputs .  In the  case 
of household production,  Y  may  be  a  vector with  some  components  endogenously 
determined  and  some  (eg.  public  goods)  exogenously  determined. 
The  expenditure  function,  obtained  from  the  dual  of  (1),  is  used  to 
define welfare  measures  (similar  to  the  method  for  price  changes) .  ~(U,Y,p) 
denotes  the  expenditure  function  for  the  dual  problem: 
~(U,Y,p)  =  Min  p  •  x 
x 
s.t.  U(x,Y)  ~ U 
(2) 
In the  following  discussion  x. 
~ 
will  denote Marshallian demand  (the 
solution to  (1»  whereas  *  x.  will  denote  compensated  demand  (the  solution 
~ 
to  (2». 
The  following  theorem  defines  the  system  of differential equations 
derived  from  the  duality of problems  (1)  and  (2)  which  are  the basis  for 
obtaining welfare  measures  from  demands  for  market  goods  observably related 
to  nonmarket  goods.  Property  for private  goods  are  well-known  and  are  found 
in many  texts but are  repeated here  as  part of the  demand  system.  Property 
(v)  has  also been  included elsewhere  (Maler).  Property  (v)  is used 
repeatedly  to  obtain the  results  given below. -8-
Theorem  1:  Provided  a  solution exists,  ~(U,y,p)  in  (2)  and U(M,Y,p) 
in  (1)  satisfy a  system of differentiable equations: 
i)  (Shephard's  Lemma) 
with boundary  conditions 
~(U,Y,p)  - M 
U - U(M,Y,p). 
Properties  satisfied by  this  system are: 
ii) 
a2~  *  ax.  ax.  a~  ax. 
-l.  =  -l.  + -l. 
api  apj  api  aM  api  api 
(Slutsky  Equation) 
iii) 
a2~  *  ax.  ax.  a~  ax. 
--~  --~ - +  --~  ayap.  ay  aM  ay  ay 
~ 
iv)  fuL  +  ~  .@ 
- 0  (Roy's  Identity) 
ap. 
~  au  ap. 
~ 
v)  ~  +  ~  au  - 0 
ay  au  ay 
vi)  ~  au 
au  aM 
- 1  for  aU/aM  >  0 
vii)  au  au(x,Y) 
ay  ay 
Proof:  Boundary  conditions  are  the  conditions  for  equivalence of the 
solutions  to  (1)  and  (2).  (i),  (ii),  (iv),  and  (vi)  may  be  found  in any 
advanced microeconomics  textbook  (e.g.  Deaton  and Muellbauer);  the  proof 
that  these  conditions  derive  from  (1)  and  (2)  is  the  same  with Y  included as 
a  parameter  as  without. 
Property  (iii)  follows  from  (i)  and differentiation of  the boundary 
* - condition xi(M,Y,p)  - xi(U,Y,p)  with  respect  to  Y for  M =  ~(U,Y,p) holding 0 
constant. -9-
The  proof of properties,  (v)  and  (vii)  follow  immediately  from  the 
"envelope  theorem"  (Varian).  For  example,  from  the  constraint in  (2): 
*  au  ax. 
I  ax.  a~ + uy - 0; 
i  1. 







U  I  UM;  x. 
1. 
ax.*  __  L_ 
ay 
Similar  to  the  method  for  market  goods  (e.g.,  Hausman;  Varian), 
observable  market  good  demand  functions  can be  used  to  solve  for  the 
expenditure  function with  nonmarket  goods  included  as  a  parameter.  If 
2  axi/ay  ~ 0 ,  then also a P.layapi  ~ 0  so  that  a  system of differential 
equations  (i)  for  aP.lapi  with Y  as  a  parameter  can be  observed and  then 
solved for  the  expenditure  function.  Procedures  are  demonstrated  in 
examples  below. 
Note  that recoverability of  p.,  U  as  functions  of Y  from  observable 
data  on  demand  is not  always  possible.  For  example ,  for 
* 
Q. 
1.  U(x,Y)  =  ITx.  +  ~y, 
•  1. 
1. 
ax.laY  ~ 0  but ax.laY - 0;  the  relation of the  expenditure  function  to Y 
1.  1. 
cannot be  recovered in this  case  from  observations  of x .. 
1. 
Integrability conditions  for  demand  systems  are  necessary  to  obtain  a 
well-defined solution of the  differential equation system  (i).  The 
integrability condition for private  goods  is  that 
~  a2
g 
aPiapj  aPjapi -10-
For  nonmarket  goods,  parallel to  the  Slutsky condition,  the  integrability 
requirement 
is not  directly testable  from  observables.  However,  differentiating both 
sides  above  with  respect  to Pj' 
a\'! 
ayap.ap. 
1.  J 
is  also required.  Equivalently, 
2 *  2 *  a x./ap.aY - a x./ap.ay. 
1.  J  J  1. 
Or,  from  (ii),  the 
a  ax.  _  (----l. 
integrability requirement  is 
ax.  a  aXi  aXi 
xi +  ~)  - ay  (  aM  Xj  +  aPj
)'  ay  aM 
Given  a  potential  demand  system which  includes both market  and nonmarket 
goods,  the  above  integrability requirement  can be  used  to  test it for 
consistency with utility maximization. 
The  following  result defines  second order properties  of  the  expenditure 
function.  The  term  -a~/ay has  been  termed  the  marginal bid for  a  nonmarket 
good Y  (Maler).  The  following  corollary  shows  under  what  conditions  the 
marginal bid value  declines  with y  and  increases  with utility and hence  has 
properties  similar  to  a  demand  relation. 
- -fu!  Lemma  1:  With  the  requirement  UM >  0,  ay  is positive if  Uy  >  0. 
quasiconcave  in M and Y  implies  that  -a~/ay is nonincreasing  in y.  If also 
U MM  <  0,  U YM  >  0,  then  -a~/ay is  increasing in U.  Also,  diminishing 
marginal utility of  income  implies  that  a2~/au2 is positive. 
Proof:  From  property  (v)  of Theorem  1, 
The  second  order properties  of  the  expenditure  function  follow  from 
properties  (v)  and  (vi)  of Theorem  1: -11-
-2- 2UyU YMU M 
-2-
L  QM)  UMUyy  - +  UyUMM 
ay  (- - 3  ay  UM 
L  ( - QM)  UMUYM  - UYUMM 
- 3  au 
ay  UM 
L  (~) 
- 3 
-UMMIUM  au  au 
QED. 
Definition of Exact Welfare  Measures  for  Nonmarket  Goods 
Below,  two  types  of  exact welfare  measures  (compensating  and  equivalent 
variation)  are  defined for  a  change  in nonmarket  good.  To  emphasize  the 
acceptability criterion,  definitions  are  given directly in terms  of  the 
expenditure  function,  as  in McKenzie  and Pearce,  rather  than  in  terms  of 
indirect  utility as  in Randall  and Stoll,  and  the  definitions  relate  changes 
in expenditure  to utility change  from  a  base  reference  point.  This 
definition can be  extended to  include  cases  in which multiple  changes  in 
prices,  incomes,  and  nonmarket  goods  occur  (see  Appendix). 
The  equivalent measure  is defined to  be  the  money  metric  equivalent of 
the  change  in utility from  U








To  obtain an  interpretation of  the  equivalent measure  in terms  of utility, 
from  the boundary  conditions  of  theorem  1, 
- 0  0 
U(J.L(U ' ,Yo'p  ),  Yo'  P  )  =  U' . 
M  (Uo  Y  po) .  - J.L  ,  ,  o  0 
(6) 
(7) -12-
Thus ,  from  (3) ,  (6)  and  (7), 
(8) 
so  the  interpretation obtained for  the  equivalent measure  is  that it gives 
the  same  utility effect as  a  change  in the nonmarket  good. 
The  compensating measure  is similarly defined  from  the  expenditure 
function  as  the  change  in utility from  UO to  U'  from  the  new  reference 
o 
(Mo ' Yo +y ,p  ) : 
C - ~(U' 'Yo+y,po)  - ~(UO,Yo+y,po).  (9) 
To  obtain the usual  interpretation of  the  compensating measure,  use  the 
boundary  conditions 
(10) 
- 0  0  0  0 
U(~(U  'Yo+y,p  ),  Yo+y,p  )  =  U  .  (11) 
From  (9),  (10),  and  (11) 
(12) 
Thus ,  the  interpretation obtained for  the  compensating measure  is that it is 
an  income  change  which  results  in holding utility constant at the  original 
level when  the  nonmarket  good  changes. 
Acceptability properties  of the  two  types  of measures  can readily be 
seen  from  (3)  and  (9).  Since  the  reference  point varies with  the  change  y, 
the  C measure  may  not provide  a  consistent  ranking of changes  in utility 
when  there  are  more  than  two  alternatives.  Thus,  as  in the price  change 
case  (Chipman  and  Moore),  the  "C"  measure will not be  an  acceptable  measure. 
However,  the  equivalent  measure will be  acceptable welfare  measure  (Chipman 
and  Moore)  since it ranks  changes  in a  nonmarket  good  consistent with  the 
resulting utility change. 
From  the  duality condition  (10),  the  E  and  C measures  can also 
equivalently be  defined  as  expenditure  change  holding utility constant: 
E  ~(U' 'Yo,po)  - ~(U' 'Yo+y,po); 
C 
000  0 
~(U  'Yo,p  )  - ~(U  'Yo+y,p  ). 
(13) 
(14) -13-
These  two  definitions will be  used  in the  results below. 
The  following  result is not  new  (see  for  example  Randall  and  Stoll or 
Bockstael  and McConnell)  but  is presented here  for  completeness . 
Lemma  2:  Compensating  and  equivalent measures  can be  defined  as  an 
integral of the  marginal bid 
- 0 
a~(U,  Y,  p)  over  the  range  of Y,  with 
ay 
utility held constant. 
Proof:  From  the  fundamental  theorem  of calculus  applied  to  (13),  (14): 
E  - f 
C  - f 
QED . 
Y +y  o 
Y  o 
Y +y  o 
Y  o 
dY;  (15) 
o  0  - a ~(U  ,Y,p  )  dY.  (16) 
ay 
Relative  Sizes  of Willingness  to  Pay  and Willingness  to  Accept  Measures 
The  question of the relative sizes  of compensating  and  equivalent 
variation measures  has  been  examined by Willig  in the  case  of price  changes 
and  by Maler  in the  case  of public  goods.  Knowledge  of the  relative sizes 
of these measures  is  important for policy analysis  purposes ,  particularly 
when  some  measures  are  easier to  estimate  then others.  Rather  than 
questioning whether  compensating  or equivalent measures  are  larger,  the  size 
relationship question has  recently been raised in  terms  of willingness  to 
pay  and willingness  to  accept.  Randall  and  Stoll studied the  size 
relationship  of willingness  to  pay  and  accept  for  the  case  of  a  quota. 
Below,  for  the  general  demand  interdependence  case,  we  show  that willingness 
to  accept  is generally greater  than willingness  to  pay based  on  results  in 
Theorem  1  and  Lemma  1. 
Randall  and Stoll defined  four  separate welfare  measures  in terms  of 
willingness  to  pay  and  accept  depending  on whether  changes  in a  nonmarket 
good  are  increases  or  decreases.  Similarly,  four  Hicksian measures  can be -14-
derived  from  the  compensating  and  equivalent measures  defined  above  by 
considering  a  positive or negative  change  (y)  from  the  reference point 
o  0  (Mo'Yo'p).  Utility is held constant at either the  original  (U  )  or new 
values  as  in  (13)  and  (14).  Figure  1  illustrates  these  four values,  both  in 
terms  of the  indifference  curves  and  as  areas.  The  representation of the 
measures  as  areas  under  a  bid curve  follows  from  Lemma  1  and  Lemma  2. 
Expressed  as  positive values,  these  four  Hicksian measures  are: 
WTpc  o  0  o  0  (17)  ~(U  ,Yo'p  )  - ~(U  ,Y  +y,p  ) 
Yo,y  0 
WT~ 
o  0  o  0  (18)  ~(U  'Yo-y,p  )  - ~(U  ,Yo'p  ) 
o,y 
WTpe  1  0  1  0  (19) 
Yo,y 
~(U  'Yo-y,p  )  - ~(U  ,Yo'p  ) 
WT~ 
2  0  2  0  (20)  ~(U  ,Yo'p  )  - ~(U  ,Y  +y,p  ) 
o,y  0 
where  the  "c"  denotes  compensating measures  and  the  "e"  denotes  equivalent 
measures  and  WTP  indicates  payment  whereas  WTA  indicates  income  gain.  The 
subscripts  Y  and  y  denote  the  starting level  of nonmarket  good  and  change,  o 
and resulting utility levels  are 
U
O  - 0 
U(Mo 'Yo'p  ) 
U1  - 0 
U(Mo'Yo-y,p  ) 
U2  - 0 
U(M  ,Y  +y,p  )  o  0 
with 
Note  that these  four  willingness  to  pay  and willingness  to  accept 
o 
definitions  are  defined in  terms  of  the  reference point  (Mo'Yo'p  ). 
Although mathematically  there are  only  two  types  of exact measures,  the 
four  Hicksian measures  have  different interpretations.  Similar  to  the 
analysis  of  (8)  and  (12) ,  these  four values  may  be  interpreted respectively 
as: -15-
Figure  1.  Alternative welfare measures  for  changes  in  nonmarket  good 
M 
1a.  Indifference Curves 
-y  y 
o 
lb.  Areas 
. +y 
y 
-8iJo(U2, Y, pO) 
8Y 
-8u(UO Y  PO) 
r  " -16-
WTpc  - the  maximum  a  consumer  would pay  as  a  lump  sum  to  obtain an 
increase  in a  nonmarket  good  (holding utility constant at the 
base  level); 
WTAc  - the  minimum  lump  sum  income  increase  required to  compensate  for 
a  given  decrease  in a  nonmarket  good  (holding utility constant 
at the base  level); 
WTpe  - the  maximum  income  deduction that is equivalent  to  a  given 
decrease  in a  nonmarket  good; 
WTAe  - the  minimum  lump  sum  income  increase  that is equivalent  to  an 
increase  in the  non-market  good. 
The  lemma  below  shows  that willingness  to  accept measures  are  bounded 
from  below by willingness  to  pay measures.  However,  there  is  no  required 
general  relationship between  compensating  and  equivalent measures. 
Theorem  2:  U y  >  0,  UM >  0,  U MM 
~ 0,  Uyy  ~ 0,  U MY 
~ 0  and U 
quasiconcave  imply  that 
WT~  ~ WTpc 
o'y  y o'y 
WT~  ~ WTpc 
o'y  Y  o'y 
WT~  ~ WTpe 
o'y 
y o'y 
Equality holds  in the  last two  comparisons  if U YM  and  0  and  U MM 
relatively small  changes  y,  if utility elasticities also  satisfy 
then also 
WT~~  >  WT~  >  WTP~  ~ WTpc 
-~o'y - o'y - o'y  Yo'y 
O.  For 
Proof:  From  corollary 1,  quasiconcavity  implies  that  the  marginal bid is 
nonincreasing in y  (_a2~/ay2 ~ 0)  so  that 
o  0 
a~(U  'YO-y,P) 
ay 
o  0 
a~(U  ,Y  +y,p  )  o 
ay -17-
Also  from  corollary 1,  U MY  ~ 0  and U yy  ~ 0  imply 
ajJ(Uo,  Y +y,po) 
o 
~  >  0  so  that  aUay  -
2  0  ajJ(U  'Yo+y,p  ) 
ay 
and 
o  0  ajJ(U  'Yo-y,p  ) 
ay 
ay 
1  0  ajJ(U  ,Y  -y,P  )  o 
~  -------~------ ay 
Thus,  from  Lemma  1,  the first  three  indicated inequalities are  obtained for 
any  change  y.  - ~  U MY 
=  0  and Uyy =  0  would  imply by  Lemma  1  that  ay  does  not 
shift with utility. 
Now  we  show  the  following  size relationships  for  relatively small 
changes  in y  satisfying the elasticity condition: 
and 
From  (17)-(20),  all bid measures  are  equal  to  zero  at  y  - O.  Thus  the 
Taylor  series representations  for  relatively small  changes yare: 






2  +  Remainder  WTP  (y; 
ay  y=O 
y  +  2  Y 
ay  y=O 
(22)  e  yo)  aWTpel  1  a
2w;
pel 
2  +  Remainder.  WTP  (y; 
ay  y=O 
y  +  2  Y 
ay  y=O 
(23)  c  yo)  =  aWTACI  y  + ! a
2w;
ACI 
2  +  Remainder  WTA  (y; 
ay  y-O 
y 
ay  y-O 
(24)  e  yo)  =  aWTAel  1  a2WTAei  2  +  Remainder.  WTA  (y;  y  +  '2  2  Y  ay  y-O  ay  y-O 
Differentiating  (17)-(20),  because  of  income  equivalences  (10)  and proper ty 












- coo - coo  - Uy(M  -WTP  ,  Y  +y,  p  )/ UM(Mo-WTP  ,  Y  +y,  p  ); 
ay 
ay 
- U (M  +WTAc ,  y  0 
2 
a~(u , Y  o 
ay 
o  -y,  p  ) 
o  -y,  p  ) 
00- C  0 
Y  -y,  p  )/ UM(Mo+WTA  ,  Y 
Po)  +y, 
- 00- e  0  0 
- Uy(Mo'  Y  +y,  p  )/ UM(Mo+WTA  ,  Y  ,  P  ), 
o  -y,  p  ); 
The  marginal bids  (25)-(28)  all have  the  same  value  at y  - 0, 
Second derivatives  of willingness  to  pay  are  found  by differentiating 
(25)-(28)  again with  respect  to  y: 
(29)  a2  WTpc  ['U2  U  - -2  2  U My  Uy  U M ) J  /  UM,  +  U MM  Uy  - M  yy 
ay 2 
(30)  a2  WTpe  _ U  U2  +  U2  U 
y.y.  M  Y.  MM 
ay 2  -3  UM 
(31)  a2  WTAc  (U2  U  +  U  U2  - 2  U My  U y  U M ) J/ UM,  M  yy  MM  Y 
ay 2 
(32)  a2  WTAe  -2 - -2  U MM  UM Uy'Y 
- U 
Y. 
ay 2  -3  UM -19-
a2  WTpc  a2  WTA c 
Quasiconcavity of U  implies  that  is negative  and  is 
positive,  implying  that WTAc  is  convex  and  WTpc  is  concave.  So,  the  Taylor 
series  implies,  WTAc  ~ WTpc  for  small  y  values.  The  signs  of  (30)  and  (32) 
are  also  opposite;  for  the  assumed elasticity size condition,  WTAe  is convex 
and WTpe  is  concave.  So,  the  Taylor  series  implies  WTAe  ~ WTpe  for  small  y 
values. 
Subtracting  (30)  from  (29), 
Therefore,  Uyy  5  0  and  UMy 
~ 0  imply,  from  the  Taylor  series,  that 
WTpe  ~ WTpc.  Similarly subtracting  (32)  from  (31),  under  the  same 
assumptions,  WTAc  ~ WTAe .  QED. 
Comparison of  Consumer  Surplus  and  Exact  Measures 
Here,  we  compare  consumer  surplus  for  complements  and  substitutes with 
exact welfare  measures.  As  for price  changes,  consumer  surplus  may  be 
viewed  as  an  approximation of exact welfare measures.  Since  the 
approximation may  not be  very  good,  rather  than making  numerical  comparisons 
for  a  special case  (eg,  constant elasticity as  in Willig and  Randall  and 
Stoll),  we  compare  the  integral  forms  of Marshallian and  exact measures  to 
provide  a  justification for  use  of consumer  surplus  type  diagrams . 
Relationships  are based  on  the properties  in Theorem  1. 
Below,  market  goods  are  separated into  two  sets  - those  related and 
those  unrelated to  a  nonmarket  good  Y  in terms  of Hicksian rather  t han 
Marshallian demand.  A  market  good  (z.)  related to  Y  is defined  to  have  the 
~ 
*  property azi/ay  ~ 0  and  a  good  which  is  independent  of Y  is defined  to  have 
*  the  property az./ay  =  O.  The  separability of market  goods  into  these  two 
~ 
sets relates  to  the possibility of  two  stage budgeting discussed by  Phl ips . -20-
It is not  always  possible  to  separate  a  system of goods  in this way  as  a 
later example will illustrate. 
We  further classify related goods  as  either Hicksian substitutes 
*  *  (azi/ay <  0)  or Hicksian  complements  (azi/ay> 0).  From  Theorem  1,  (iii), 
the  relation between Marshallian and Hicksian  demand  effects  is given by 
(33)  *  az.  lay - az·laM  a~/ay  +  az.lay. 
L  L  L 
Therefore,  if it is  observed that az.lay <  0,  then also 
L 
*  *  az.  lay <  0  since  a~/ay <0. 
L  For  Hicksian  complementary  goods  (az.  lay> 0), 
L 
observed  demands  must  also  satisfy az.lay >  O.  For  goods  independent  of  Y, 
L 
*  since  aZ i  lay - 0, 
azi/ay - (Uy/UM )  azi/aM, 
so  a  nonmarket  good affects  market  good  demand  only  through  the  income 
effect. 
In  the  following  results,  relationships between Hicksian  demand  curves 
and  the Marshallian  demand  curve  are based on properties  defined in 
Theorem  1. 
aZ i 
(aM  ~ 0) . 
We  will  assume  that  goods  related to Yare noninferior 
A zero  income  effect  (az.laM  =  0)  is sufficient for  the  Hicksian 
L 
and Marshallian  demand  curves  to  coincide by  (33). 
Also,  the  set of  goods  related to  Y will be  denoted by  {z.}  whereas 
L 
{q.}  will  denote  the  set of  goods  independent  of Y.  Since  expenditure  can 
L 
be  decomposed  as: 
* - * - ~(U,  Y,  p)  =  pz·z  (U,  Y,  p)  +  Pq·q  (U,  Y,  p), 
by definitions  of goods  related and unrelated  to  Y, 
* 
(34)  Ql!!  QL  -ay  ~ - Pz  •  ay  . 
The  boundary  conditions  imply  that  the  Marshallian and Hicksian  demand 
curves  intersect at certain specified points.  For  normal  goods,  the  Slutsky 
condition 








says  that the  slope  of  the  compensated  demand  curve  i s  l ess  negative  than 
the  slope  of Marsha11ian  demand  curve  at points  wher e  they  intersect.  For 
the  inverse  demand  functions  diagrammed  in Figures  2-4,  t he  sl opes  are  the 
inverses  of  and  Bzi/BPi'  and  so  Hicksian  demand  curves  ar e  more 
steeply sloped than  inverse  Marsha11ian  demand  curves. 
The  following  result specifies  allowable  relationships  between market 
and nonmarket  goods. 
Lemma  3:  For  goods  related to  Y,  either all goods  are  Hicksian 
substitutes;  or,  if there  is  a  Hicksian complementary  good,  t her e  must  also 
be  at least one  substitute  good. 
Proof:  By  property  (v) ,  ful:.  l\/UM >  O.  By  (34),  By 
*  ful:.  Bz  0  - p .- >  By  z  By 
is  implied.  The  case  of all substitute  goods  satisfies  this  sign  condition. 
If the  only  good  related to Y were  a  Hicksian complement,  then  the  above 
inequality would be  contradicted.  Thus  for  any  complementary  good,  there 
must  also be  at least one  substitute  good  to  obtain the  proper  sign  for 
QED . 
Imperfect Substitutes  and  Complements 
The  change  in consumer  surplus  (the  area between  Mar sha11ian  demand 
curves)  is illustrated in Figure  2a,b  for both substitutes  and  complements. 
The  following  theorem  gives  a  sufficient condition for  a  Hicksian measure  to 
be  equivalently  expressed as  an area between  compensat ed  demand  curves . 
Therefore,  by  analogy,  consumer  surplus  provides  an  appropriate geometrical 
representation,  regardless whether  or not it is  a  good  numerical 
approximation of  a  Hicksian measure. 
The  "weak  complementarity"  property  (Maler;  Bradf ord)  i s  a  restriction 
for  when  the  consumer  surplus  area  may  be  used  t o  measure  benefits.  Maler 
defined  "weak  complementarity"  to  hold  i f  U  (0,  q ,  Y)  - O.  Willig used  a 
y -22-
similar property to  ensure  finiteness  of consumer  surplus  for  quality 
changes  in the  "repackaging"  model.  Problems  with this  condition are  that 
it is  only defined  for  complements,  and  tests of it may  be  difficult to 
observe.  Later  examples  show it may  also be  difficult to  fulfill. 
First,  we  define  a  price restriction which  applies  to  substitutes  as 
well  as  complements.  Define  the  "CCD"  (constant compensated  demand)  price 
vector p  to be  a  finite price vector  for  market  goods  related to Y  such  that 
compensated private  demand  is constant  (not necessarily zero)  with  respect 
to  the  nonmarket  good.  For  a  complement,  p  is  a  price sufficiently high  z. 
~ 
such  that compensated  demand  for  market  good  z.  becomes  constant  (at a 
~ 
*  minimum  consumption level or  zero) ;  thus  8z.j8y - 0  for  pz.  ;::  pz ..  For 
~ 
~  ~ 
substitute,  the  CCD  price pz .  is  a  price sufficiently low  such  that 
~ 
compensated  demand  is constant  for  pz.  ~ pz.  (i.e.,  the  consumer  becomes 
~  ~ 
satiated with  the  market  good) .  Figure  2a,b  illustrates  substitute and 
complement  cases.  Note  that  such  a  price  may  not  always  exist. 
a 
"'Weak  substitution"  is  defined  to  be  the  property  ~y(U ,  Y,  p)  - 0  with 
*  8zi j8y  ~ 0,  whereas  for  weak  complementarity,  ~y(U,  Y,  p)  - 0  is satisfied 
*  with  8z.j8y ;::  O. 
~ 
Lemma  4 :  Existence  of  a  CCD  price vector  implies  the  property of  "weak 
complementarity"  for  goods  related t o  Y  as  complements;  similarly existence 
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Proof:  Suppose  the  CCD  price exists.  Then by  definition of  the  CCD 
price,  compensated  demand  is constant for  p  larger  than  the  CCD  price for  z. 
~ 
complements,  or  smaller  than the  CCD  price  for  substitutes.  By  (34),  the 
expenditure  function satisfies 
*  a~/ay - pz·az lay. 
Evaluating this derivative at prices  in the  relevant price  range  (above  pz. 
~ 
for  complements  and  below pz.  for  substitutes),  the  right hand  side is 
~ 
zero.  Thus,  a~/ay is  zero  for prices  in  the  relevant range.  QED. 
Marshallian demand  for  related markp.t  goods  will also be  constant with 
respect  to  y  at the  CCD  price vector  since 
az/ay  azlaM  a~/ay  *  +  az  lay - o. 
However,  as  Figure  2  illustrates,  Marshallian  and Hicksian  demand  are 
constant at different values,  not both at zero  in the  case  of complements. 
By  property  (v)  of Theorem  1,  the Maler definition that U (0,  q,  Y)  =  0 
Y 
- max  is obtained for  complements  and  U  (z  ,  q ,  Y)  =  0  is obtained for  y 
substitutes where  zmax  is  the  satiation level  for  the  related market  good. 
The  following  theorem  shows  that existence  of  the  CCD  price vector  is  a 
sufficient condition so  that an  exact measure  can be  equivalently expressed 
as  an area between  compensated  demand  curves .  The  proof may  be  extended  to 
apply  to  sets of  goods  related to  Y,  particularly for  complementary  goods . 
Theorem  3:  Suppose  that  a  CCD  price exists  for  a  single substitute 
good  (z)  related to  Y.  Then  an  exact measure  of benefit for  a  change  in  a 
nonmarket  good  from  Y  to Y'  for  the  relevant U  is  equal  to  the  change  in  o 
* - * - area between  the  compensated  demand  curves  z  (U'Yo,p)  and  z  (U,Y' ,p)  for 
prices  between  p~ and  the  CCD  price Pz' -26-
For  a  set of  goods  related to Y,  if the  CCD  price vector Pz  exists,  a 
Hicksian measure  is equal  to  the  difference  in the  integrals  over  the  sum  of 
related compensated  demands,  integrated between price vectors  po  and  p  and  z  z 
holding utility constant at the  appropriate  level  as  Y changes  from  Y  to  o 
Y' . 
Proof:  First,  consider  the  case  when  only  one  good  (z)  is related to Y 
as  a  substitute and let Y'  denote  a  level of nonmarket  good greater  than Yo; 
Figure  2a  illustrates this  case.  (The  proof is similar for  a  quantity 
* - decrease.)  Suppose  existence  of  the  CCD  price Pz  .r.llch  that  z  (U,Y,Pq'pz)  is 
constant  for  p  <  Pz'  Then  by  the  lemma  above,  z 
aJ.L(U,  Y, 
0 
pz)  Pg' 
- 0  for  all Y  ~ Y  ay  0 
Thus,  adding  a  zero  term  to  the  integral  form  of an  exact measure: 
= 
Y'  a  (U  0  0)  Y' 
- 0  0  - 0 
aJ.L(u,y,Pg'pz)  aJ.L(u,y,Pg'pz) 
t,J.L  - I 
Y  o 
J.L  ,y,Pg'Pz  I 
ay  dy  =  Y  ay  +  ay  dy, 
o 
By  the  Fundamental  Theorem  of Calculus,  the  right hand  side  is 
Y' 
~ I 
Y  o 
dp  dy.  z 
By  Theorem  1,  property  (i),  and  interchange  of order of integration, 
Y' 
I  L 
y  ay 
o 
again 'by  the  Fundamental  Theorem, -27-
For  mUltiple  goods  related to  Y,  Pz  is  a  price vector such  that  the 
marginal bid is zero.  The  same  proof applies  for  sets  of substitutes  or 
complements  and substitutes where  the  inner  integral is defined over  a  sum 
of  demands  for  related goods.  Then,  the  exact measure  is equal  to  a 
difference  in integrals  defined over  the  sum  of related compensated  demands . 
The  Slutsky  symmetry  conditions  are  also  required for path  independence  but 
are  satisfied because  of the  use  of compensated  demand.  QED. 
Existence  of a  price  such  that compensated  and Marshallian demands  are 
constant is  a  major  difficulty in application of  the  result.  (See  the 
examples  below.)  Another  issue  is  that  even when  both exact  and  surplus 
measures  can be  expressed as  areas  between  demand  curves ,  the  relative sizes 
of  the Hicksian and  the Marshallian surplus  areas  could be  very different 
(as  in Lankford). 
Perfect Substitutes 
The  vertical area under  the  inverse Marshallian demand  curve  is 
illustrated in Figure  3;  it has  been used  to  measure benefits when  the 
nonmarket  good  (Y)  is  a  "perfect substitute"  for  a  market  good  (z).  The 
theorem below justifies this  measurement  of benefits. 
*  We  define  z  and Y to be  perfect substitutes when  az  lay - -1 .  Here , 
although  the  nonmarket  good Y is essentially the  same  as  the  private  good  z 
in terms  of producing utility,  market price  is  only  charged  for  z .  The 
public  good  is either free  or  is  financed  through  income  tax.  (This  case  is 
different  from  the  quota  case which  has  an  upper  bound restriction on  a 
private  good  regardless  of price. ) 
Lemma  5:  Perfect substitutes  are  obtained when  the  consumer  problem 
(1)  is  of  the  form 
Max  U(  z  +  Y,  q)  z,  q 
s.t. 
(36) -28-
Proof:  Taking  the  derivative  of  the  indirect utility in  (36) , 
*  +1)  *  U  (z  +  U  (qy)  - 0.  y  y  q 
*  *  By  definition of q,  qy  - 0,  thus,  z  - -1  is  obtained.  QED.  y 
For  perfect substitutes,  the  following  theorem  compares  exact measures, 
consumer  surplus  (CS),  and  the  market value  of  a  change  in the  nonmarket 
o  good  from  an initial point  (Yo'  p  ). 
Theorem  4:  For  perfect substitutes,  assuming 
UMy  > °  UMM  <  0,  UM >  0,  Uy  > °  and U  is  quasiconcave,  the  following 
relationships hold for  a  gain  (g)  or  a  loss  (1)  of y: 
When  UMM 
o  p  y  >  CS  z  g 
WTAc  >  CSl 
o  >  p  y.  z 
U  - U  ~ 0 ,  then  MY  yy 
WTAc  _  WTpc  _  p~y. 
Proof:  The  proof is  illustrated in Figure  3.  In Figure  3,  the  marginal bid 
curve  with utility constant at UO is  graphed against Y  on  the horizontal 
axis  whereas  the  Marshallian  demand  (z)  with public  good  at Y  is  graphed  o 
against p  on  the vertical axis .  z 
To  show  the  relation between  the  Marshallian demand  curve  and  the bid 
curve  with utility held constant at UO,  the  following  relationship  for 
perfect substitutes  is used: 
U(M,  Y,  p)  - U(z(M,  Y,  p)  +  Y,  q(M,  Y,  p)). 
Taking  the  derivative  of both sides with respect  to  y  and  applying  the 
envelope  theorem, 
U  U  (z  +  1)  +  U  q  Y  z  Y  q  Y 
- UM(PzZy  +  Pqqy +  pz) 
UM Pz -29-
P~  -----------
[[IT]  Marshalilan  Surplus 
z 
'( 
Figure 3.  Ccrnparison of Marshallian and Hicksian Measures for a  Perfect Substitute -30-
so 
Pz  - Uy(M,  Y,  P);UM(M,  Y,  p). 
Therefore,  by property  (v)  of Theorem  1,  at the  initial point  (M  ,Y  ,po)  the  o  0 
o  Marshallian  inverse  demand  and marginal bid take  on  the  same  value of p  .  z 
To  compare  the  slopes  of the marginal bid curve  and  inverse  demand 
curve with respect  to  y,  differentiating the  above  with  income  held constant 
apz 




By  Lemma  1,  the bid curve  slope  satisfies 
~ 
- 2- 2  U  UM U My 
U 2U  UM Uyy  - +  y  Y  MM 
ay 2  - 3  UM 
Therefore,  the  assumptions  U MY  >  0  and  Uyy >  0  imply 
ap  ___  z 
ay 
- 2- Uy  UM U My  - Uy  U MM 
~--~~~--~--~  >  O. 
That  is,  the  area  under  the  marginal bid curve,  integrated with respect  to 
y,  will be  less  than  the  area under  the  inverse  demand  curve,  integrated 
with respect  to  y. 
By  Theorem  1,  property  (i) 
a2Jl.layapz  - -1; 
*  az  lay  =  -1  implies 
integration with  respect  to  p  implies  z 
Thus 
o  0 
au(U  .y,p)  0  C(  UO  0)  ay  - Pz  +  y,  ,p  I 
o  0  C(y,U  ,p  )  represents  the  difference  between  the marginal bid curve 
and  the  constant price line at Pz  =  p~.  Differentiating the  above  with 
respect  to  y, 
200 
~  (Uo  0)  aC(y,u  ,P  ) 
2  ,y,P  -
ay  ay -31-
By  Lemma  1,  C(y,UO,po)  is  decreasing as  y  increases  when  U is  quasiconcave . 
Since  the Marshallian and  compensated  demand  coincide at the  initial point 
00000  (Mo'Yo'p  ),  C(O,U  ,p  )  - O.  Therefore  C(y,U  ,p  )  must  be  positive  for 
Y  -y <  Y  and negative  for  Y  +y  >  Yo '  If second derivatives of U with  o  0  0 
respect  to  M and yare all zero,  then  C is  identically zero.  QED. 
Comparison  of  Change  in Spending  and  Exact Measures 
Since  exact measures  are  changes  in expenditure,  the  change  in spending 
for  related goods  is  immediately  suggested as  an alternative  to  consumer 
surplus  as  an  approximation method.  (Obviously,  since  income  is held 
constant,  the  change  in total spending must  be  zero)  but here  only related 
goods  are  to be  considered.)  For  the perfect substitutes  case,  a  change  (y) 
in a  public  good will not  reduce  spending  for  the  market  good by  the  full 
market value  of y  (by  (33)).  The  results below  extend  this  observation  to 
compare  change  in spending  and  exact measures. 
Define  the  change  in spending  for  related goods  as  the  absolute value 
of the  change  in price  times  quantities  demanded,  summed  over all market 
goods  related to Y,  for  old  (Y  )  and  new  (Y')  levels  for  nonmarket  goods:  o 
~E - Ip~·[Z(M,yo'pO)  - z(M,Y' ,po)] I. 
Consider  an  increase  in nonmarket  good  from  Yo  to  Yo+y.  From  (34)  and  the 
fundamental  theorem of calculus,  the  Hicksian benefit measures  for  an 
increase  in Yare equivalently defined by 
f
y  +y  - 0  fY  +y  o  Bu(U,y,p  )  d  0  - Y - - Y  By  Y 
o  0 
* - 0  Bz  (U,y,p  )  dy 
pz·  By 
* - 0  * - 0  pz·[z  (U,Yo'p  )-z  (U'Yo+Y,p  )] 
for  alternative U values.  Similarly,  for  a  decrease  in nonmarket  good, 
Y 
/:'p.  = f  0 
Y  -y  o 
- 0 
Bu(U,y'p  )  dy 
By -32-
The  similarity of  ~E and  ~~ is clear:  exact measures  are  obtained  from  the 
market value  of compensated  demand  differences  for related goods  whereas  the 
change  in spending is obtained from  the market value  of Marshallian demand 
differences  for  related goods. 
The  following  theorem  compares  the  relative sizes  of  ~E and  ~~. 
Figure  4  illustrates  the  theorem  for  a  substitute  good. 
Theorem  5:  Let  z  be  a  vector  of normal  market  goods  related to  a 
nonmarket  good Y,  either as  substitutes or with substitutes  and  complements. 
Under  the  conditions  of  Lemma  1,  a  change  in spending for  related goods  z  is 
less  than all exact measures.  A zero  income  effect  (az/aM=O)  implies  that 
the  measures  are  equal. 
Proof:  The  results  obtain  from  the  property 
*  ~  az  ill!  >  O. 
au  aM  au 
First,  consider  one  substitute  good  and  the  effect of an  increase  in Y. 
Define  U2  - U(Mo'Yo+y,po)  and U
O 




0*0  0 
z(Mo'Yo'p  )  - z  (U  'Yo,p  ) 
o  0  *  0  0 
[z(Mo'Yo'p  )  - z(Mo'Yo+y,p  )]  - [z  (U  'Yo,p  ) 
*  0  0  *  0  0  - [z  (U  ,Y  ,p  )  - z  (U  ,Y  +y,P  )]  o  0 
*  0  0  *  2  0 
+  [z  (U  'Yo+Y,p  )  - z  (U  'Yo+Y,p  )]. 
c  *  0  0  *  2  0 
~E - WTP  +  Pz  •  [z  (U  'Yo+Y,p  )  - z  (U  'Yo+Y,p  )]. 
* - -
*  2  0  - z  (U  ,Y  +y,P  )]  o 
Since  compensated  demand  z  (U,Y,p)  increases with  U,  the  bracketed term 
above  is negative  so  we  obtain  ~E ~ WTpc.  Similarly, 
o  0  *  0  0  *  2  0  z(M  ,Y  ,p  )  - z(M  ,Y  +y,P  )  =  z  (U  ,Y  ,p  )  - z  (U  ,Y  +y,P  )  o  0  0  0  0  0 
*  2  0  *  2  0  *  0  0  *  2  0 
- [z  (U  'Yo'p  )  - z  (U  'Yo+Y,p  )]  +  [z  (U  'Yo'p  )  - z  (U  'Yo'p  )] -33-
ITIIIJ  Marshallian 
Z  and Yare  substitutes;  Y  increases  to  Y'; 
1  h 
t .... pc.  change  in spending  is  ess  t  an  w. 
Figure  4.  Comparison of spending  and  expenditure  measures -34-
For  a  decrease  in Y, 
~E - WTA
c 
+  P z 
*  1  0  *  0  0  0  •  [z  (U  ,Y  -y,p  )  - z  (U  ,Y  -y,p  )].  o  0 
Since  the bracketed term  is negative,  the  change  in spending is less  than 
WTAc .  Likewise  ~E ~ WTpe  for  a  decrease  since 
~E - WTpe  +  pz  •  [z*(Ul,yo'po)  - z*(UO,yo,po)]. 
If there  is more  than  one  substitute  good  related to  Y,  then  the proof 
is easily extended by  considering  z  to  be  a  vector with vector 
multiplication indicated by  p  ·Z.  .  z 
If some  goods  are  complements  and  some  are  substitutes,  the vector  z 
represents  the  set of related complements  and  substitutes.  Eg.,  for  an 
increase  in Y, 
1
*0  *  0  0 
~E - pz·[z  (U  'Yo,p)  - z  (U  'Yo+y,p  )] 
*  0  0  *  2  0  I  +  pz·[z  (U  'Yo+y,p  )  - z  (U  'Yo+y,p  )]  . 
The  first term  inside  the  absolute value  is  WTpc  and  the  second  term  is 
negative;  thus  ~E  is less  then WTpc.  Similarly for  other  cases,  the  terms 
inside  the  absolute value  operator will have  opposite  signs.  QED. 
Note  that  Lemma  3  and Theorem  5  imply  that it is necessary  to  consider 
all goods  related to  Y  in order  to  obtain the  greatest  lower  bound  estimate 
for  exact measures.  In particular,  for  complements,  changes  in spending for 
related substitute  goods  should also be  considered.  If it is not  feasible 
to  consider all goods  related to  a  nonmarket  good,  then at least those with 
large effects  on  ~~ should be  considered.  Considering  the  relation of  ~~ to 
*  azi/ ayand  (33),  such  goods  are  those  which have  higher market prices, 
larger  income  elasticities,  and  are  more  impacted by  the  nonmarket  good. -35-
Derivation of Exact  Measures  from  Market  Data 
The  purpose  of the  following  examples  is to  demonstrate  how  to  use  the 
results of Theorem  1  to obtain exact measures  of welfare  from  market 
observations.  As  in the  case  of price changes  in private  goods,  there  is no 
need  to  approximate  exact welfare measures  if the  expenditure  function  can 
conveniently be  obtained since  exact measures  can be  expressed in closed 
form  as  differences  in expenditure. 
The  method  for  solving  the  system of differential equations  given  in 
Theorem  1  is similar  to  the  method used by  Hausman  for  price  changes  in 
private  goods.  However,  Hausman's  paper  did not  derive  exact measures  in 
the  case  of  demand  systems.  Here  we  demonstrate  how  to  obtain exact 
measures  for  demand  systems  including nonmarket  goods .  The  examples 
demonstrate  that exact measures  can be  obtained even when  consumer  surplus 
cannot be  defined.  The  following  examples  include  two  commonly  used  demand 
systems  (linear expenditure  and  AIDS)  extended  to  incorporate  nonmarket 
goods. 
Example  1:  Maler's  Example 
First,  we  use Maler's  example  (p.  187)  as  a  simple  demonstration.  The 
method of solution is different from Maler's  since  weak  complementarity is 
not  assumed  as  he  does.  Actually,  the  nonmarket  and  market  goods  are 
substitutes,  not  complements! 
The  demand  system  for  two  goods  z  and  q  related to  a  public  good Y 
is: 
z  =  .J:L  8Y 
2p  2  z 
M  + 
SY 
q  =  2p  Pz  2p 
q  q 
and it is easily shown  that  the  system satisfies integrability conditi ons. 












- Pz  2p q 
The  system  is solved by  finding  the  homogeneous  solution and  a  particular 
solution for  the  system.  A solution is given by 
and 
_  U  1/2  1/2  _  8Yp 
~  Pq  Pz  z 
U 
M +  8Yp z 
defined  to  satisfy the  b0~ndary condition  ~(ij,y,p)  - M.  Note  in this  case 
that UMY  - 0  and Uyy - O.  The  compensated  demand  equations  are 
*  z 
*  q 
U  1/2 
Pg 
2  1/2 
Pz 
U  1/2 
Pz 
2  1/2 
Pg 
- 8Y 
*  *  Note  that az  lay <  0  (a  substitute)  while  aq  lay - 0  (q*  is  independent  of 
Y).  In this  case 
The  change  in spending  on  z  (the  good  related t o  Y)  is half this  amount: 
t.E  _  po  8y/2. 
z 
There  is  no  price  such  that  demand  goes  to  zero.  Therefore,  the 
appropriate  consumer  surplus  area cannot  be  computed when  z  and Yare 
imperfect  substitutes .  Perfect substitution holds  for  8-1;  in this  case, 
the Marshallian area for  gains  is 
MM g 
o 
M  3pz  Y  0 
3  In(l + -M--) 5  Pz  y . -37-
Example  2:  Linear  Expenditure  System 
The  following  example,  a  modified linear expenditure  system,  is  a 
simple  example  of  a  larger  demand  system which  includes  a  nonmarket  good. 
Suppose  a  nonmarket  good affects  the  minimum  consumption  requirement  for 
good  one  to  reduce it to  ~1/8Y;  other  minimum  requirements,  not affected by 
Y,  are  given by  ~i'  The  demand  system is then  given by  : 
xl  =  ~l/ey +  ~l/Pl[M - L p.~.  - Pl~l/eYl 
i~l  1  1 
x.  =  ~.  +  ~./p.[M - L  p.~.  - Pl~l/eYl,  for  i  - 2,  n 
1  1  1  1  i~l  1  1 
with  Ifl.  =  1.  The  corresponding differential equation system  to  be  solved 
1 
is 
a~/ap.  - ~.  +  ~./p. [~- L  p.~.  - Pl~l/eYl. 
1  1  1  1  i~l  1  1 




U  - [M  - L  p.~.  - Pl~l/eYl/npi 
i~l  1  1 
Compensated  demands  are 
*  - ~j 
xl - ~l/ey +  ~lU ITPj  /Pl 
*  ~. 
xi  ~  ~i +  ~lU ITPj  J/Pl 
so  that all goods  except  good  one  are  independent of Y.  Note  that  Y  is  a 
substitute for  since  *  axl/ay <  0  for  e  >  O. 
Exact  measures  are 
WTpc  [1- 1  lie  - Pl~l  Y  - Y  +y 
o  0 
and -38-
Change  in spending  on  good  one  for  an  increase  in Y is 
1 
6E  - ~lPl(l-fil)[Y-
o 
which  is  a  smaller  than WIpc. 
1 
- Y +yl/8 
o 
6E  will be  a  good  approximation of  if 
fil  is  small  (consumption of good  one  is close  to  the  minimum  requirement). 
There  is no  finite price  such  that  demand  for xl  is constant  and  so  the 
consumer  surplus  area cannot  be  computed. 
Example  3:  Almost  Ideal  Demand  System 
This  example  demonstrates  a  more  complicated  demand  system  (the  "almost 
ideal  demand  system"  or  AIDS)  modified  to  include  nonmarket  goods  related to 
market  goods.  The  AIDS  system  allows  both  substitutes  and  complements. 
The  AIDS  system  (Deaton  and Muellbauer)  has  the  following  properties. 
Marshallian budget  share  equations  are: 
+  I~·k log Pk  +  fi·  log M/P  k  1.  1. 
w.  - CX. 
1.  1. 
where  P  is  a  price  index  defined by 
with parameter restrictions 
n 
Ifik  - 0,  I~k'  - 0,  I~k'  - 0,  ~ki - ~ik'  Icxk  - 1 
k  1.  •  1.  1  1. 
so  that expenditure  shares  of  income  "add  up"  to  total  income.  The  term  ~ki 
indicates  the  interaction effect on  expenditure  between  good  i  and  good  k . 
The  resulting expenditure  function  is of the  form 
log  ~  ~ log  P  +  Ub(p) 
where 
and  the  indirect utility function  is 
- 1 
U - b(p)  log M/P. -39-
Suppose  a  nonmarket  good  reduces  the budget  share of  a  market  good  (use 
good  1  for  example).  This  effect may  be  modeled by  replacing  Pl  by  Pl/8Y 
in the  AIDS  system where  8  is  a  scaling parameter.  Then,  the budget 
shares  in the  AIDS  system  are modified  as  follows: 
and  the  overall price  index  is also modified: 
log  pI  ~ log  P  - a l  log8Y  - I~kl log Pk  log  8Y. 
Here,  the  expenditure  share  for  each  good  is affected by  a  change  in 
nonmarket  good both  due  to  direct interaction effect with  good  one  and  the 
effect of the  nonmarket  good  on  the  overall price  index. 
where 
The  solution of the  modified  system is 
1 
-/3 
b(p) (8Y)  1 
log M/Pl. 
That  is,increasing the  nonmarket  good  reduces  expenditure  for  market  goods 
at any  fixed level of indirect utility.  (To  verify that  the  above  is  the 
appropriate  solution,  it must be  shown  that  the  conditions  of Theorem  one 
are  satisfied.)  The  resulting compensated expenditure  shares  are 
*  ~ 
p.  B  log  H'  w.  ---.b 
Pi  ~  BPi  p.'  Bp. 
~ 
-/3 
- a.  +  I~ki log Pk + U  I  /3 .  b (p) (8Y)  1  - ~il log  8Y. 
~  ~ 
Compensated  expenditure  shares  for  each  good  are  affected by  Y  both  through 
the  ~il term  and  through  the  indirect utility term. 
A  market  good  and  the  nonmarket  good  are Hicksian substitutes if 
~il ~ O.  Hicksian complements  require  ~il ~ O.  A  good  would  be  independent 
of Y  for  any  level  of utility if and  only if ~il  /3i 
=  O.  Thus,  all goods 
with expenditure  shares  related  to  income  (/3i  >  0)  must  also be  related  to 
Y.  (Fortunately,  this  system is  amenable  to  aggregation  in  terms  of goods!) -40-
Consumer  surplus measures  may  not be  used because  there  is no  CCD  pr.ice 
unless  demand  is identically constant  (wi =  a i ).  However,  Hicksian welfare 
measures  for  an  exogenous  change  in Yare readily computed  as  a  change  in 
expenditure,  holding utility constant.  For  example,  we  obtain 
so  WTpe  ~ WTpc.  Note  that willingness  to  pay  is  a  fraction of  income 
depending  on  the  percent  change  in public  good weighted by  the  price effect 
of  the  public  good  and  the  income  share  effect. 
Conclusions 
Traditional methods  to measure  benefits  of nonmarket  good  changes  have 
used procedures  based  on Marshallian demand  to value benefits,  either  change 
in spending  for  related market  goods  or  change  in consumer  surplus. 
Different  consumer  surplus  areas  apply  for  complements,  imperfect 
substitutes,  and perfect substitutes.  Use  of surplus  measures  also  requires 
a  condition of weak substitutability or  complementarity.  In contrast,  no 
such  requirements  are  needed  for  computing  exact measures,  and distinctions 
with  regard to  the  type  of  demand  relationship need not be  made  to  compute 
exact welfare  measures.  Exact measures  are  obtained  from  differences  in the 
expenditure  function  and  the  same  methods  apply  regardless  of  the  type  of 
demand  relationship.  Furthermore,  exact measures  can be  applied for 
simultaneous  changes  in prices,  income,  and  public  goods . 
This  paper  demonstrated that exact welfare  calculations  for  public 
goods  can be  based  on  observable  market  relationships  in many  cases.  Demand 
systems  with known  expenditure  functions  (e.g.  linear expenditure  or AIDS) 
can be  used.  Therefore,  procedures  based  on  the  expenditure  function  can be -41-
applied even when  the necessary  conditions  to  use  consumer  surplus 
(finiteness of the  relevant area  and  path  independence)  do  not hold.  When 
expenditure  functions  are not  given  in closed form,  or  demand  systems  are 
incomplete,  numerical  methods  such as  those  suggested by Vartia or McKenzie 
can be  used  to  approximate welfare  measures  consistent with expenditure 
theory. 
For policy purposes,  lower  bound  approximations  of benefits  may  be 
adequate  to  make  decisions  regarding nonmarket  goods.  Considering  the 
complexity of evaluating welfare  measures,  it may  be  more  convenient  to 
approximate welfare  effects by  the  change  in spending  for  goods  related to  a 
nonmarket  good.  However,  to  obtain  a  good  lower  bound welfare  estimate,  all 
goods  with  a  strong relationship  to  a  nonmarket  good  should be  identified. 
When  the  relationship between  a  market  and nonmarket  good  is  one  of 
complementarity,  this paper  showed  that there  must  also be  some  substitute 
goods  in the  set of goods  related to  a  nonmarket  good. 
Besides welfare  evaluation,  a  traditional use  of consumer  surplus has 
been to  illustrate "net"  welfare  effects of policy  changes  in diagrams 
including both  supply  and  demand.  Because  exact measures  can also be 
expressed as  area differences  in terms  of compensated  demands,  consumer 
surplus  type  diagrams  still apply  to  illustrate the nature  of net welfare 
effects .  However,  it is not necessary  to  perform  computations  in the  same 
way  that illustrative diagrams  are  constructed! 
Since  alternative exact welfare measures  depend  on  specified initial 
conditions  and differ in size,  the  appropriateness  of which  measure  to  use 
for policy analysis  remains  as  an ethical question  . . -42-
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Appendix  1 
Definition of Compensating  and  Equivalent Measures 
for  Combinations  of Price.  Quantity.  and  Income  Changes 
Policy evaluation may  require  comparisons  of situations  in which 
combined  changes  in prices,  incomes,  and nonmarket  goods  occur. 
Generalizing  from  the  work here  and  corresponding work  for price 
changes  in McKenzie  and  Pearce,  the  definition of exact measures  is 
easily extended for  cases with  combined  changes.  In each  case,  a  money 
metric  measure  is defined  as  the  change  in the  expenditure  function  due 
to  a  change  in utility from  a  given starting point. 
Considering  an initial point  and alterred income, 
public  goods,  and prices,  M',  Y',  and p',  six alternative utility 
levels  apply: 
uO  - 0 
U(Mo'Yo'p  ) 
Ul  - 0 







uS  _  U(M'  ,Y' ,p') 
First consider  a  combined price  and public  good  quantity change . 
Suppose  p'  <  po  and  Y'  > Y.  Then  U4  >  uO  and  there exists  E4  > °  o 
such  that 
By  duality -45-
- 4  0  0  4 
U(~(U  'Yo,p  )'Yo,p  )  - U  , 
U(M  +  E4 ,Y  ,po)  _  U(M  ,Y' ,p'). 
000 
Thus,  the  equivalent measure  gives  the  amount  of  income  which  is 
equivalent in utility to both  the price  and  income  change.  Such  a 
b  1  b  d  f ·  d'  h  11'  >  po  d  num  er maya so  e  e  ~ne  ~n ot er cases  as  we  ,e.g.,  p  an 
Y'  >  Y  but then we  may  not  know  the  sign of  E.  o 
For  the  compensating measure,  define 






,y' ,p')  - U(Mo'Yo'po). 
Thus  C4  is  the  number  which,  when  subtracted from  income  after both 
price  and nonmarket  good  changes,  gives  the  same  utility as  initially . 
For  combined  income  and price  changes,  similarly defining 
33000 
E  - ~(U  'Yo'p  )  - ~(U  'Yo'p  ), 
by duality 
Also,  defining 
by duality 
For  combined  changes  in prices,  income ,  and nonmarket  goods , 
defining -46-
by  duality 
5  0  0-
U(jJ(U  'YO ,p  ) 'YO,p  )  - U(M' ,Y' ,p') 
or 
Similarly,  defining 
gives 
50- U(M  +E  ,Y  ,p  )  - U(M'  ,Y' ,p').  o  0 
550  C  - jJ(U  ,Y' ,p')  - jJ(U  ,Y' ,p') 
U(M'-CS,Y',p')  =U(M  ,Y  ,po). 
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